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Algebraic Manipulation Detection Codes via Highly
Nonlinear Functions
Minfeng Shao and Ying Miao
Abstract
In this paper, we study the relationship between algebraic manipulation detection (AMD) codes and highly nonlinear functions.
As applications, on one hand, a generic construction for systematic AMD codes is introduced based on highly nonlinear functions.
Systematic AMD codes with new parameters can be generated from known highly nonlinear functions. Especially, several infinite
classes of optimal systematic AMD codes, some with asymptotically optimal tag size, can be constructed. On the other hand,
systematic AMD codes are used to construct highly nonlinear functions. The known construction by Cramer et al. [10] for
systematic AMD codes turns out to be based on a special kind of functions with high nonlinearity.
Keywords: Algebraic manipulation detection code, highly nonlinear function, nonlinearityp, partial nonlinearity.
I. INTRODUCTION
Algebraic manipulation detection (AMD) codes were first introduced by Cramer et al. [10] to convert linear secret sharing
schemes into robust secret sharing schemes and build nearly optimal robust fuzzy extractors. An AMD code can be viewed as
an authentication code without a secret key. Generally speaking, an AMD code consists of a probabilistic encoding map E and
a determined decoding function Dec, where E encodes a plaintext s into a ciphertext g ∈R Gs such that any tampering will be
detected, except with a small constant error probability. For AMD codes, we consider the attack model such that an adversary
may manipulate the valid message g = E(s) by adding some offset ∆ of his choice. The attack model is divided into two
sub-models by distinguishing two different settings: the adversary has full knowledge of the source (the strong attack model)
and the adversary has no knowledge about the source (the weak attack model). The main objective for an AMD code is, for a
given tag size, to minimize the success probability of an adversary such that g +∆ ∈ Gs′ , i.e., Dec(g
′) = s′ 6= Dec(g) = s.
Here the tag size denotes the difference between the length of the plaintext and its corresponding ciphertext.
Upon to now, there are mainly two kinds of known constructions for AMD codes. One is via algebraic methods. In [10],
Cramer et al. proposed a construction of AMD codes with nearly optimal tag size based on polynomial evaluations. In [21],
Reed-Muller codes were included to construct AMD codes. Later in [12], linear codes such as BCH codes were included
to generate AMD codes with small tag size. The other one is via combinatorial method, which generates AMD codes by
carefully designing the combinatorial structures behind, i.e., the structure of image sets of the probabilistic encoding map
E. In [11], Cramer et al. first introduced a kind of differential structures to construct AMD codes. In [30], Paterson and
Stinson characterized optimal AMD codes with various types of generalized external difference families (say, strong external
difference families) for different merits of optimality, respectively. In [18] and [32], for the weak attack model, combinatorial
characterizations were given for AMD codes via weighted external difference families. In the past few years, many efforts
have been devoted to construct AMD codes and their corresponding generalized external difference families (see [19], [23],
[24], [30], [36], [37], and the references therein).
In cryptography, another interesting topic closely related to authentication codes are functions with high nonlinearity [6].
Highly nonlinear functions such as bent functions received much attention not only for their applications in cryptography (for
instances, combining keystream generators for stream ciphers [13], S-boxes for block ciphers [8], [28], functions with optimal
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2algebraic immunity [33], and authentication codes [7], [16]), sequences design [15], [29] and coding theory [5], [38], but also
for their close relationship with combinatorial designs [14], [31].
In this paper, we study the relationship between AMD codes and highly nonlinear functions. On one hand, we propose a
generic construction of AMD codes via functions with high nonlinearity. By choosing special highly nonlinear functions such
as perfect nonlinear functions, a few infinite classes of AMD codes with new parameters can be generated for both weak
and strong attack models. For the weak attack model, R-optimal AMD codes have asymptotically optimal tag size can be
constructed. For the strong attack model, some AMD codes generated by our construction are proved to have the minimum
possible probability of successful tampering. On the other hand, we try to construct highly nonlinear functions from known
AMD codes. Based on a subclass of AMD codes with more strict assumptions, highly nonlinear functions can be generated,
where their nonlinearities are determined by the parameters of the corresponding AMD codes. Especially, we prove that the
known construction in [10, Theorem 2] can also be explained by highly nonlinear functions.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we introduce some preliminaries about AMD codes. In
Section III, we construct systematic AMD codes via highly nonlinear functions for the weak attack model, whereas Section
IV is devoted to construct systematic AMD codes under the strong attack model. In Section V, highly nonlinear functions are
constructed based on known systematic AMD codes. Conclusion is drawn in Section VI.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we recap some notation, definitions and results about AMD codes.
Definition 1: Let S be a set of plaintext messages with size m termed the source space, and G be the encoded message
space, which is usually an Abelian group of order n. Consider a pair of a probabilistic encoding map E : S → G and a
deterministic decoding function Dec : G → S ∪ {⊥} such that Dec(E(s)) = s with probability 1 for any s ∈ S. Let Gs be
the set of valid encodings of s ∈ S, i.e., Gs , {g ∈ G : Dec(g) = s}.
(1) The pair (E,Dec) is called a strong (m,n, ρ) algebraic manipulation detection (AMD) code if for any s ∈ S, ∆ ∈ G\{0},
the probability of Dec(E(s) + ∆) 6∈ {s,⊥} is at most ρ, i.e., Pr(Dec(E(s) + ∆) 6∈ {s,⊥}) ≤ ρ ≤ 1.
(2) The pair (E,Dec) is called a weak (m,n, ρ)-AMD code if for any ∆ ∈ G \ {0} and any random s ∈R S rather than an
arbitrary one, the probability
∑
s∈S Pr(s)
∑
g∈Gs
Pr(E(s) = g) Pr(Dec(g +∆)) 6∈ {s,⊥}) ≤ ρ.
(3) An AMD code (E,Dec), whether strong or weak, is called systematic if S = A1 is an Abelian group, G is an Abelian
group A1 ×A2 ×B, and the encoding has the form
E : A1 → A1 ×A2 ×B with E(s) = (s, x, f(s, x)) (1)
for some function f : A1×A2 → B and x ∈R A2. For a systematic AMD code, the decoding function is naturally given
by
Dec(s, x, t) =

s, if t = f(s, x),⊥, otherwise. (2)
Note that by randomly adding (δ1, δ2, δ3) ∈ A1 ×A2 ×A3 to (s, x, f(s, x)), we can make (s, x, f(s, x)) unreadable to the
adversary.
Throughout this paper, we fix the following notation for AMD codes.
• An (m,n, ρ)-AMD code is said to have equiprobable sources if Pr(s) = 1
m
for any s ∈ S.
• An (m,n, ρ)-AMD code is said to be equiprobable encoding if Pr(E(s) = g) = 1|Gs| for any s ∈ S and g ∈ Gs.
• An (m,n, ρ)-AMD code is said to be uniform if |Gs| is constant for any s ∈ S.
• A uniform (m,n, ρ)-AMD code with |Gs| = t for s ∈ S is said to be t-regular if it has equiprobable sources and
equiprobable encoding.
For a systematic AMD code, if Pr(E(s) = (s, x = x0, f(s, x0)) 6= 0 for any s ∈ A1 and x ∈R A2 that is for any x0 ∈ A2,
Pr(x = x0) > 0, then it is |A2|-uniform. Thus, an equiprobable encoding systematic AMD code with equiprobable sources is
|A2|-regular.
3Definition 2 ([10]): The tag size of an (m,n, ρ)-AMD code is ̟ = log |G| − log |S| = logn− logm.
For the convenience of theoretic analysis, for any u, k ∈ N, define effective tag size as ̟∗(k, u) = min{log |G|}−u, where
the minimum is over all (|S|, |G|, ρ)-AMD codes such that |S| ≥ 2u and ρ ≤ 2−k. In [10], Cramer et al. derived a lower
bound for ̟∗(k, u) as follows.
Lemma 1 ([10]): For any u, k ∈ N, the effective tag size is lower bounded by
̟∗(k, u) ≥ 2k − 2−u+1 ≥ 2k − 1
for strong AMD codes, and
̟∗(k, u) ≥ k − 2−u+1 ≥ k − 1
for weak AMD codes, respectively.
Besides the above bound for the effective tag size of an AMD code, the following theoretic bounds on the parameters are
also known.
Lemma 2 ([30]): For any weak (m,n, ρ)-AMD code, we have
ρ ≥
a(m− 1)
m(n− 1)
,
where a =
∑
s∈S |Gs|.
Especially, for t-regular weak AMD codes, the probability of successful tampering is lower bounded as follows.
Lemma 3 ([30], [32]): For any t-regular weak (m,n, ρ)-AMD codes, we have
ρ ≥
⌈
t2m(m− 1)
n− 1
⌉
1
tm
. (3)
Definition 3 ([30], [32]): A weak AMD code is R-optimal if its parameters meet the bound in Lemma 2 with equality
(or Lemma 3 for the t-regular case). Here, “R” indicates that random choosing ∆ is an optimal strategy for the adversary.
Lemma 4 ([30]): For any strong (m,n, ρ)-AMD code, we have
ρs ≥
1
|Gs|
(4)
for any source s ∈ S, where ρs is the probability of successful tampering given the source s ∈ S for a random chosen ∆.
Definition 4 ([30]): A strong AMD code is G-optimal if its parameters meet the bound in Lemma 4 with equality. Here,
“G” indicates that guessing the most likely encoding is an optimal strategy for the adversary.
III. WEAK ALGEBRAIC MANIPULATION DETECTION CODES FROM HIGHLY NONLINEAR FUNCTIONS
In this section, we propose a construction for systematic weak AMD codes via highly nonlinear functions. Systematic weak
AMD codes with asymptotically optimal effective tag size are constructed in Corollaries 1 and 2, and R-optimal systematic
weak AMD codes are constructed in Corollaries 3 and 5.
First of all, we recall some necessary definitions about nonlinearity of functions.
Let (A,+) and (B,+) be two Abelian groups with order n and m, respectively. Let f be a function from A to B. One
robust way to measure the nonlinearity of a function f from A to B is to use the derivatives Da(f(x)) = f(x + a) − f(x)
for a ∈ A, which is closely related to differential cryptanalysis [4], [28].
Definition 5 ([28]): The nonlinearity Pf of a function f from A to B is defined as
Pf , max
a∈A\{0}
max
b∈B
Pr (Da(f(x)) = b) = max
a∈A\{0}
max
b∈B
|{x ∈ A : Da(f(x)) = b}|
|A|
, (5)
where Pr(Da(f(x)) = b) denotes the probability of the occurrence of the event Da(f(x)) = b.
Remark 1: The Hamming distance between two functions f and g from A to B is defined to be d(f, g) = |{x ∈ A :
f(x) 6= g(x)}|. A function f is linear if and only if f(x + y) = f(x) + f(y) for all x, y ∈ A. A function g is affine if and
4only if g = f + b, where f is linear and b is a constant. An alternative method of measuring the nonlinearity of a function
f : A→ B is given by the minimum Hamming distance between f and all possible affine functions from A to B [29]. This
measure of nonlinearity is closely related to linear cryptanalysis [25]. For the relationship between these two definitions of
nonlinearity, the reader is referred to [6], [9], for instances. In this paper, the former definition of nonlinearity is used.
It is easy to check (see, for example, [6]) that Pf = 1 if f is a linear function from A to B, and Pf ≥
1
|B| for any function
f from A to B. The smaller the value of Pf , the higher the corresponding nonlinearity of f .
Definition 6 ([28]): A function f from A to B is said to have perfect nonlinearity if Pf =
1
|B| .
Construction A: Let f be a function from A = A1×A2 to B and let S = A1 be a subgroup of A. Define a probabilistic
encoding map Ef : A1 → G = A×B = A1 ×A2 ×B as
Ef (S1) = (S1, S2, f(S1, S2)), (6)
where S2 ∈R A2.
By the probabilistic encoding map Ef and the corresponding deterministic decoding function given by (2), we can define a
systematic AMD code (Ef ,Dec) from A1 to G = A×B = A1 ×A2 ×B. Note that a possible successful tampering should
satisfy ∆ ∈ (A1 \{0})×A2×B. However, for the nonlinearity, we should consider all possible ∆ ∈ A1×A2×B \{(0, 0, 0)}.
Thus, to the convenience of analysis, we introduce the partial nonlinearity of a function, which only considers the case
∆ ∈ (A1 \ {0})×A2 ×B.
Definition 7: The partial nonlinearity Ψf (A1) of a function f from A = A1 ×A2 to B is defined as
Ψf(A1) , max
a1∈A1\{0}
max
a2∈A2
max
b∈B
Pr
(
D(a1,a2)(f(x)) = b
)
= max
a1∈A1\{0}
max
a2∈A2
max
b∈B
|{x ∈ A : D(a1,a2)(f(x)) = b}|
|A|
, (7)
whereA1 is a subgroup ofA and Pr
(
D(a1,a2)(f(x)) = b
)
denotes the probability of the occurrence of the eventD(a1,a2)(f(x)) =
b.
Remark 2: By Definitions 5 and 7, we have Pf ≥ Ψf(A1) for any subgroup A1 of A.
The parameters of the constructed AMD code have the following relationship with the nonlinearity of f .
Theorem 1: If the function f from A = A1 × A2 to B with partial nonlinearity Ψf (A1) has equiprobable sources and
Ef is equiprobable encoding, then the systematic weak AMD code (Ef ,Dec) generated by Construction A has parameters
(n1, n1n2m,Ψf (A1) ≤ Pf ), where |A1| = n1, |A2| = n2, |B| = m and Pf denotes the nonlinearity of f .
Proof. By Construction A, we only need to prove that the probability of successful tampering is upper bounded by Ψf(A1).
For any ∆ = (a1, a2, b) ∈ G = A1 ×A2 ×B with a1 ∈ A1 \ {0}, a2 ∈ A2 and b ∈ B,∑
S1∈A1
Pr(S′ = S1)
∑
S2∈A2
Pr(Ef (S1) = (S1, S2, f(S1, S2)) Pr(Dec((S1, S2, f(S1, S2)) + ∆) 6∈ {S1,⊥})
=
∑
S1∈A1
Pr(S′ = S1)
∑
S2∈A2
Pr(S∗ = S2) Pr(Dec((S1, S2, f(S1, S2)) + ∆) 6∈ {S1,⊥}) (8)
=
∑
S1∈A1
1
|A1|
∑
S2∈A2
1
|A2|
Pr(f(S1 + a1, S2 + a2) = f(S1, S2) + b)
=
1
|A1||A2|
∑
S1∈A1
∑
S2∈A2
Pr(f(S1 + a1, S2 + a2) = f(S1, S2) + b)
=
1
|A1||A2|
|{(S′, S∗) ∈ A : f(S′ + a1, S
∗ + a2)− f(S
′, S∗) = b}|
≤ Ψf (A1) ≤ Pf .
According to Definitions 1 and 7, we know that the systematic weak AMD code (Ef ,Dec) generated by Construction A has
parameters (n1, n1n2m,Ψf(A1) ≤ Pf ), which completes the proof. 
In what follows, we list some well-known highly nonlinear functions and their corresponding systematic AMD codes as
applications of Construction A.
5A. Linear functions
One simple but useful way to obtain functions with high nonlinearity is to use linear functions from (Fqr ,+) to (Fq,+) as
functions from (F∗qr ,×)
∼= (Zqr−1,+) to (Fq,+).
Lemma 5 ([6]): Any nonzero linear function L from (Fqr ,+) to (Fq,+) is a function from (F
∗
qr ,×) to (Fq,+) with
nonlinearity Pf =
1
q
+ 1
q(qr−1) .
Applying the highly nonlinear functions in Lemma 5, the following corollary follows directly from Construction A and
Theorem 1.
Corollary 1: Let A = (Zqr−1,+) and B = (Fq,+). Further let A1 = (Zm1 ,+) and A2 = (Zm2 ,+) be two subgroups
of A with order m1 and m2 =
qr−1
m1
, respectively. If gcd(m1,m2) = 1, then A ∼= A1 ×A2. Define the probabilistic encoding
map EL from A1 to G = A1 ×A2 ×B as
EL(s1) = (s1, s2, L(Φ(s1, s2))), (9)
where s2 ∈R A2, Φ is an isomorphism from Zqr−1 to (F
∗
qr ,×), and L(x) is a nonzero linear function from (F
∗
qr ,×) to
(Fq,+). If the systematic weak AMD code (EL,Dec) given by (9) and (2) has equiprobable sources and EL is equiprobable
encoding, then it is an m2-regular (m1, (q
r − 1)q, 1
q
+ 1
q(qr−1))-AMD code.
Corollary 2: Let r ∈ N and m2 be a factor of q
r − 1. Further let m1 =
qr−1
m2
, u = ⌊logm1⌋, and k = ⌊log
qr−1
qr−1
⌋. If
gcd(m1,m2) = 1, then the effective tag size ̟
∗(k, u) for weak AMD codes satisfies
k − 1 ≤ ̟∗(k, u) < k + 1 + log
m2q
r
qr − 1
.
The systematic weak AMD code in Corollary 1 has an asymptotically optimal effective tag size with respect to the bound in
Lemma 1, i.e., limk→∞
log |G|−log |A1|
k−1 = 1.
Proof: By Corollary 1, there exists a systematic weak AMD code with |A1| =
qr−1
m2
≥ 2u, ρ = q
r−1
qr−1 ≤ 2
−k, and the tag
size
̟ = log |G| − log |A1| = log(m2q) = logm2 + log q.
Note that
̟ − k = logm2 + log q −
⌊
log
qr − 1
qr−1
⌋
< 1 + logm2 + log
qr
qr − 1
.
The first conclusion then follows from the fact that for any k, u ∈ N, we have k− 1 ≤ ̟∗(k, u) ≤ ̟. The second conclusion
can be derived by the fact that
lim
k→∞
log |G| − log |A1|
k − 1
= lim
q→∞
1 + logm2 + log
qr
qr−1 + k
k − 1
= 1
by noting that m2 ∈ N is a constant.
B. Maiorana-McFarland’s class of functions
Let r ∈ N and q be a prime power. Define a function f : (F2rq ,+)→ (Fq,+) as
f(x1, x2, . . . , x2r) =
∑
1≤i≤r
xixi+r. (10)
Lemma 6 ([26]): The function f(x1, x2, . . . , x2r) defined by (10) has perfect nonlinearity Pf =
1
q
.
Corollary 3: Let A1 = (Fq2r−1 ,+) and A2 = B = (Fq,+), where we regard an element of Fq2r−1 as a vector in F
2r−1
q .
Define the probabilistic encoding map Ef from A1 to G = A1 ×A2 × B as
Ef (S1) = (S1, s2, f(S1, s2)) =

x1, x2, . . . , x2r−1, s2, xrs2 + ∑
1≤i≤r−1
xixi+r

 , (11)
6where S1 = (x1, x2, . . . , x2r−1) ∈ A1, s2 ∈R A2, and f is defined by (10). If the systematic weak AMD code (Ef ,Dec) given
by (11) and (2) has equiprobable sources and Ef is equiprobable encoding, then it is an R-optimal q-regular (q
2r−1, q2r+1, 1
q
)-
AMD code with respect to the bound in Lemma 3.
Proof. The statement that the constructed AMD code (Ef ,Dec) has parameters (q
2r−1, q2r+1, 1
q
) directly follows from Theorem
1, Lemma 6, and the fact that it is q-regular. According to Lemma 3, we should have
ρ ≥
⌈
q2q2r−1(q2r−1 − 1)
q2r+1 − 1
⌉
1
q2r
=
1
q
,
which means that the constructed AMD code is R-optimal. 
Corollary 4: For any k, u ∈ N, the effective tag size ̟∗(k, u) for weak AMD codes is bounded as follows:
k − 1 ≤ ̟∗(k, u) ≤ 2k.
Proof: For any given k and u, choose q = 2k and r to be the smallest positive integer such that u ≤ k(2r − 1).
According to Corollary 3, there exists a systematic weak AMD code with |A1| = q
2r−1 ≥ 2u, ρ = 1
q
≤ 2−k, and the tag size
̟ = log |G| − log |A1| = 2 log q = 2k. Then the claim follows from the fact that k − 1 ≤ ̟
∗(k, u) ≤ ̟.
C. Dillon’s class of functions
In this subsection, we recall the well-known Dillon’s class of functions with perfect nonlinearity. A function g : A→ B is
balanced if the size of g−1(b) is the same for every b ∈ B, which is |A|/|B|. It is known (see, for example, [6]) that g has
perfect nonlinearity if and only if for every a ∈ A \ {0}, the derivative Da(g(x)) is balanced, and this is possible only when
|B| divides |A|.
Lemma 7 ([14]): For any r ∈ N, let Frq be identified with the finite field Fqr and let g be any balanced function from
Fqr to Fq. Then the function f : (Fq2r ,+)→ (Fq,+) defined by
f(x, y) = g(xyq
r−2), x, y ∈ Fqr
has perfect nonlinearity Pf =
1
q
.
Corollary 5: Let A1 = (Fq2r−1 ,+) and A2 = B = (Fq,+), where we regard an element of Fq2r−1 as a vector in F
2r−1
q .
Let g : Fqr → Fq be a balanced function. Define the probabilistic encoding map Ef from A1 to G = A1 ×A2 ×B as
Ef (S1) = (S1, yr, f(X,Y )) =
(
x1, x2, . . . , xr, y1, y2, . . . , yr−1, yr, g(XY
qr−2)
)
, (12)
where S1 = (x1, x2, . . . , xr , y1, y2, . . . , yr−1) ∈ A1, yr ∈R A2, X = (x1, x2, . . . , xr), and Y = (y1, y2, . . . , yr). If the
systematic weak AMD code (Ef ,Dec) given by (12) and (2) has equiprobable sources and Ef is equiprobable encoding, then
it is an R-optimal q-regular (q2r−1, q2r+1, 1
q
)-AMD code with respect to the bound in Lemma 3.
The proof of Corollary 5 is similar to that of Corollary 3 so we omit it here. Note that although the parameters of the
systematic weak AMD codes constructed in Corollaries 3 and 5 are the same, their probabilistic encoding maps are different.
IV. STRONG ALGEBRAIC MANIPULATION DETECTION CODES FROM HIGHLY NONLINEAR FUNCTIONS
In this section, we consider the systematic strong AMD codes generated by Construction A via highly nonlinear functions.
We first analyze the relationship between the nonlinearity of the function f and the probability of successful tampering in
Theorem 2. By choosing some special functions, we construct systematic strong AMD codes as examples in Corollaries 6 and
7.
By the probabilistic encoding map Ef given by (6) and the corresponding decoding function given by (2), we can define a
systematic AMD code (Ef ,Dec) from A1 to G = A×B = A1 ×A2 ×B. In what follows, we first analyze the relationship
between parameters of the strong AMD code generated by Construction A and the nonlinearity of f .
7Theorem 2: Let f be a function from A = A1 × A2 to B with nonlinearity Pf and partial nonlinearity Ψf (A1), where
|A1| = n1, |A2| = n2, and |B| = m. For the equiprobable encoding case, the systematic strong AMD code (Ef ,Dec) generated
by Construction A has parameters (n1, n1n2m, ρ) if and only if for any given S1 ∈ A1,
|{S∗ ∈ A2 : f(S1 + a1, S
∗ + a2) = f(S1, S
∗) + b}|
|A2|
≤ ρ (13)
holds for any ∆ = (a1, a2, b) ∈ (A1 \ {0})×A2 ×B. The parameter ρ satisfies that ρ ≥ Ψf (A1) ≥
1
|B| . Furthermore, if f is
a perfect nonlinear function, then we have ρ ≥ Pf .
Proof. By Construction A and Definition 1, the AMD code (Ef ,Dec) generated by Construction A has parameters (n1, n1n2m, ρ)
if and only if for any S1 ∈ A1,
Pr(Dec(Ef (S1) + ∆) 6∈ {S1,⊥}) ≤ ρ (14)
holds for any ∆ = (a1, a2, b) ∈ G with a ∈ A1 \ {0}, a2 ∈ A2, and b ∈ B. But
Pr(Dec(Ef (S1) + ∆) 6∈ {S1,⊥}) =
∑
S∗∈A2
Pr(S2 = S
∗) Pr(f(S1 + a1, S
∗ + a2) = f(S1, S
∗) + b)
=
∑
S∗∈A2
1
|A2|
Pr(f(S1 + a1, S
∗ + a2) = f(S1, S
∗) + b)
=
|{S∗ ∈ A2 : f(S1 + a1, S
∗ + a2) = f(S1, S
∗) + b}|
|A2|
,
where the second equality follows from the fact that Ef is equiprobable encoding. Therefore, (14) is equivalent with (13).
Now we prove ρ ≥ Ψf(A1). Clearly, there exists a fixed ∆ = (a1, a2, b) ∈ (A1 \ {0}) × A2 × B such that Ψf(A1) =
Pr(D(a1,a2)(f(S1, S2)) = b). Then
Ψf (A1) = Pr(D(a1,a2)(f(S1, S2) = b)
=
∑
S1∈A1
|{S∗ ∈ A2 : f(S1 + a1, S
∗ + a2) = f(S1, S
∗) + b}|
|A1||A2|
≤
∑
S1∈A1
ρ
|A1|
= ρ.
For any a1 ∈ A1 \ {0} and a2 ∈ A2,
max
b∈B
|{(S′, S∗) ∈ A1 ×A2 : D(a1,a2)(f(S
′, S∗)) = b}|
|A1||A2|
≥
∑
b∈B
|{(S′,S∗)∈A1×A2: D(a1,a2)(f(S
′,S∗))=b}|
|A1||A2|
|B|
=
1
|B|
implies that Ψf (A1) ≥
1
|B| .
At last, if f is a perfect nonlinear function, then we have 1|B| = Pf ≥ Ψf (A1) ≥
1
|B| according to Remark 2. Thus, we
have ρ ≥ Ψf(A1) = Pf =
1
|B| . 
In what follows, we list a few systematic strong AMD codes with ρ = 1|B| . Especially, we include the classes of Maiorana-
McFarland functions and Dillon functions to construct such AMD codes.
Based on Theorem 2 and Lemma 4, we have the following corollary. Herein we highlight that this explicit construction was
first introduced in [21]. We recall it as an application of our generic construction and the prove is only for completeness.
8Corollary 6 ([21]): Let A1 = A2 = Fqr and B = Fq, where we regard an element of Fqr as a vector in F
r
q . Define the
probabilistic encoding map Ef from A1 to G = A1 ×A2 ×B as
Ef (S1) = (S1, S2, f(S1, S2)) =

x1, x2, . . . , xr, xr+1, . . . , x2r, ∑
1≤i≤r
xixi+r

 ,
where S1 = (x1, x2, . . . , xr) ∈ A1, S2 = (xr+1, xr+2, . . . , x2r) ∈R A2, and f is defined by (10). Then, for the equiprobable
encoding case, the systematic strong AMD code given by Ef has parameters (q
r, q2r+1, 1
q
), where ρ = 1
q
is minimum with
respect to Theorem 2. Especially, when r = 1, the q-regular AMD code is G-optimal with respect to the bound in Lemma 4.
Proof: We first prove ρ = Pf =
1
q
. By Theorem 2, we only need to prove that for any S1 ∈ Fqr , a1 ∈ Fqr \{0}, a2 ∈ Fqr ,
and b ∈ Fq,
|{S2 ∈ Fqr : f(S1 + a1, S2 + a2) = f(S1, S2) + b}|
qr
≤
1
q
, (15)
i.e., f(S1 + a1, S2 + a2) = f(S1, S2) + b has at most q
r−1 solutions for S2 ∈ Fqr . Since a1 6= 0, without loss of generality,
we may assume a1 = (a11, a12, . . . , a1r) with a1r 6= 0. Note that
f(S1 + a1, S2 + a2)− f(S1, S2)− b = h(S +∆)− h(S) + (xr + a1r)(x2r + a2r)− xrx2r − b
= h(S +∆)− h(S) + a1rx2r + a2rxr + a1ra2r − b,
(16)
where
h(S) = h(S1, S2) = h(x1, x2, . . . , x2r) ,


∑
1≤i≤r−1 xixi+r, r ≥ 2,
0, r = 1,
∆ = (a1, a2) = (a11, a12, . . . , a1r, a21, a22, . . . a2r), and a2 = (a21, a22, . . . , a2r). For any given (x1, x2, . . . , x2r−1) ∈ F
2r−1
q ,
a1 ∈ Fqr \ {0}, and a2 ∈ Fqr , the fact h(S+∆)−h(S)+ a1rx2r + a2rxr+ a1ra2r− b = 0 has at most one solution x2r ∈ Fq
implies that (16) has at most qr−1 solutions for all possible S2 ∈ Fqr , i.e., (15) holds. Then ρ = Pf =
1
q
by Theorem 2.
The second assertion is obvious from the definitions.
Remark 3: (1) For more general form of functions with perfect nonlinearity, similar to f in (10), the interested reader is
referred to [9], [20], [22], [26].
Recalling the well-known Dillon’s class of functions with perfect nonlinearity in Lemma 7, we have the following corollary.
Note that the trace function Trq
r
q : Fqr → Fq defined by Tr
qr
q (x) =
∑
0≤i≤r−1 x
qi is a balanced function.
Corollary 7: Let A1 = A2 = Fqr and B = Fq, where we regard an element of Fqr as a vector in F
r
q. Let {α1, α2, . . . , αr}
and {β1, β2, . . . , βr} be a pair of dual bases of Fqr over Fq , that is,
Trq
r
q (αiβj) =

1, i = j,0, otherwise. (17)
Define f : (Fq2r ,+) → (Fq,+) as f(x, y) = Tr
qr
q (xˆ
qr−2yˆ), where x = (x1, x2, . . . , xr) ∈ Fqr , y = (y1, y2, . . . , yr) ∈ Fqr ,
xˆ =
∑
1≤i≤r xiαi, and yˆ =
∑
1≤i≤r yiβi. Define the probabilisitic encoding map Ef from A1 to G = A1 ×A2 ×B as
Ef (S1) = (S1, S2, f(S1, S2)),
where S1 = (x1, x2, . . . , xr) ∈ A1, S2 = (y1, y2, . . . , yr) ∈R A2. Then, for the equiprobable encoding case, the systematic
strong AMD code given by Ef has parameters (q
r, q2r+1, 1
q
), where ρ = 1
q
is minimum with respect to Theorem 2. Especially,
when r = 1, the q-regular AMD code is G-optimal with respect to the bound in Lemma 4.
Proof: To prove ρ = 1
q
, according to Theorem 2, it suffices to prove that for any S1 ∈ Fqr , a1 = (a11, . . . , a1r) ∈
Fqr \ {(0, 0, . . . , 0)}, a2 = (a21, . . . , a2r) ∈ Fqr , and b ∈ Fq,
|{S2 ∈ Fqr : f(S1 + a1, S2 + a2) = f(S1, S2) + b}|
qr
≤
1
q
,
9i.e., f(S1 + a1, S2 + a2) = f(S1, S2) + b has at most q
r−1 solutions for S2 ∈ Fqr . Let
Sˆ1
qr−2
=
∑
1≤i≤r
x′1iαi, (18)
(Sˆ1 +
∑
1≤i≤r
a1iαi)
qr−2 =
∑
1≤i≤r
x∗1iαi, (19)
and
a′ = (a′11 = x
∗
11 − x
′
11, . . . , a
′
1r = x
∗
1r − x
′
1r). (20)
Since a1 6= (0, 0, . . . , 0) and x
qr−2 is a non-identity permutation of Fqr , we have a
′ 6= (0, 0, . . . , 0). Without loss of generality,
we may assume a′11 6= 0. By (17)-(20),
f(S1 + a1, S2 + a2)− f(S1, S2)− b
= y1

Trqrq

β1

Sˆ1 + ∑
1≤i≤r
a1iαi


qr−2

− Trqrq (β1Sˆ1qr−2)

+ C(S, a1, a2, b)
= a′11y1 + C(S, a1, a2, b),
where S = (x1, x2, . . . , xr, y2, . . . , yr) ∈ Fq2r−1 and C(S, a1, a2, b) is a constant determined by S, a1, a2, and b. Thus, the
fact a′11 6= 0 means that f(S1 + a1, S2 + a2)− f(S1, S2)− b = 0 has at most q
r−1 solutions for S2 ∈ Fqr , which completes
the proof.
V. HIGHLY NONLINEAR FUNCTIONS FROM ALGEBRAIC MANIPULATION DETECTION CODES
By Theorems 1 and 2, we can construct systematic AMD codes from known highly nonlinear functions for both weak and
strong attack models. In this section, we further analyze the relationship between AMD codes and highly nonlinear functions.
Specially, we try to construct highly nonlinear functions from some given systematic AMD codes. Note that a strong (m,n, ρ)-
AMD code is always a weak (m,n, ρ)-AMD code. Thus, throughout this section, we only consider the functions derived from
weak AMD codes.
Let A1, A2 and B be Abelian groups. For a given systematic AMD code with probabilisitic encoding map E : A1 →
A1 ×A2 ×B,
E(s1) = (s1, s2, ts1,s2), s1 ∈ A1, s2 ∈R A2,
define a function fE from A1 ×A2 to B as
fE(s1, s2) = ts1,s2 . (21)
Theorem 3: Let E : A1 → A1 × A2 × B be the probabilisitic encoding map of a systematic regular weak AMD code
with parameters (m,n, ρ), where m = |A1| and n = |A1||A2||B|. Then the function fE : A1 ×A2 → B has nonlinearity
PfE ≤ max{{ρ} ∪ {PfE,s′ : s
′ ∈ A1}},
where fE,s′(x) , fE(s
′, x) is a function from A2 to B defined by fE and s
′ ∈ A1, and PfE,s′ denotes the nonlinearity of
fE,s′ .
Proof: Let ρ(∆1,∆2,∆3) denote the probability of successful tampering (∆1,∆2,∆3) ∈ (A1 \ {0})×A2 ×B. Then
ρ ≥max
{
ρ(∆1,∆2,∆3) : (∆1,∆2,∆3) ∈ (A1 \ {0})×A2 ×B
}
= max
∆1∈A1\{0}
max
∆2∈A2
max
∆3∈B
{ ∑
s′∈A1
Pr(s1 = s
′)
∑
s∗∈A2
Pr(s2 = s
∗) Pr(fE(s
′ +∆1, s
∗ +∆2) = fE(s
′, s∗) + ∆3)
}
= max
∆1∈A1\{0}
max
∆2∈A2
max
∆3∈B
{ ∑
s′∈A1
1
|A1|
∑
s∗∈A2
1
|A2|
Pr(fE(s
′ +∆1, s
∗ +∆2) = fE(s
′, s∗) + ∆3)
}
= max
∆1∈A1\{0}
max
∆2∈A2
max
∆3∈B
{
|{(s′, s∗) ∈ A1 ×A2 : fE(s
′ +∆1, s
∗ +∆2) = fE(s
′, s∗) + ∆3}|
|A1||A2|
}
.
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Meanwhile, for ∆1 = 0 and ∆2 ∈ A2 \ {0}, we define
ρ(0,∆2,∆3) ,
|{(s′, s∗) ∈ A1 ×A2 : fE(s
′, s∗ +∆2) = fE(s
′, s∗) + ∆3}|
|A1||A2|
.
Then
max
∆2∈A2\{0}
max
∆3∈B
ρ(0,∆2,∆3)
= max
∆2∈A2\{0}
max
∆3∈B
∑
s′∈A1
|{(s′, s∗) ∈ A1 ×A2 : fE,s′(s
∗ +∆2) = fE,s′(s
∗) + ∆3}|
|A1||A2|
≤max{PfE,s′ : s
′ ∈ A1},
where the last inequality comes from the fact that
PfE,s′ = max
∆2∈A2\{0}
max
∆3∈B
|{(s′, s∗) ∈ A1 ×A2 : fE,s′(s
∗ +∆2) = fE,s′(s
∗) + ∆3}|
|A2|
.
Therefore,
PfE = max
(∆1,∆2)∈A1×A2\{(0,0)}
max
∆3∈B
|{(s′, s∗) ∈ A1 ×A2 : f(s
′ +∆1, s
∗ +∆2) = f(s
′, s∗) + ∆3}|
|A1||A2|
=max{max{ρ(∆1,∆2,∆3) : ∆1 ∈ A1 \ {0},∆2 ∈ A2,∆3 ∈ B},max{ρ(0,∆2,∆3) : ∆2 ∈ A2 \ {0},∆3 ∈ B}}
≤max{{ρ} ∪ {PfE,s′ : s
′ ∈ A1}}.
Generally speaking, from a systematic AMD code we can not determine the nonlinearity of the function fE directly. It is
also related with the nonlinearity of some functions with restricted input [27]. This is mainly because that in an AMD code,
we do not regard the case Dec(E(s) +∆) = s as an adversary’s successful tampering, as shown in Theorem 3. However, for
a stronger setting [11], [21], [34], [35] also named as stronger AMD code, the case Dec(E(s) + ∆) 6= ⊥ is regarded as an
adversary’s successful tampering. In this setting, we directly have the following result. The proof is similar, so we omit it here.
Theorem 4: Let E : A1 → A1 ×A2 ×B be the probabilisitic encoding map of a systematic regular weak AMD code. If
Pr(Dec(E(s) + ∆) 6= ⊥) ≤ ρ,
i.e., it forms a stronger AMD code, then the function fE : A1 ×A2 → B defined as (21) has nonlinearity PfE ≤ ρ.
As an application of Theorem 3, we analyse the functions derived from the systematic q-regular strong AMD codes in [10,
Theorem 2].
Corollary 8: Let q be a power of a prime p, and t > 0 be an integer such that p ∤ (t+ 2). Let (Eh,Dec) be the known
systematic q-regular strong AMD codes in [10, Theorem 2] with parameters (qt, qt+2, t+1
q
), where the probabilistic encoding
map Eh : Fqt → Fqt × Fq × Fq is given by
Eh(S = (s1, s2, . . . , st)) = (S, x, h(S, x))
with x ∈R Fq and
h(S, x) = xt+2 +
∑
1≤t≤t
six
i. (22)
Then the function h(S, x) can be viewed as a function from (Fqt+1 ,+) to (Fq,+) with nonlinearity Ph ≤
t+1
q
, where we
regard elements of Fqt+1 as vectors in F
t+1
q .
Proof: According to Theorem 3, it suffices to prove that for any given S1 ∈ Fqt , Ph(E,Si) ≤
t+1
q
holds, where h(E,S1)(x) =
h(S1, x) is a function from Fq to Fq. By (22), for any given S1 = (s1, s2, . . . , st) ∈ Fqt and ∆ ∈ Fq \ {0}, we have
h(E,S1)(x +∆)− h(E,S1)(x) = (x+∆)
t+2 − xt+2 +
∑
1≤i≤t
si((x +∆)
t − xt) = R(S1,∆)(x),
where deg(R(S1,∆)(x)) = t+ 1, since p ∤ (t+ 2). Thus, for any S1 ∈ Fqt ,
Ph(E,S1) = max∆∈Fq\{0}
max
b∈Fq
|{x ∈ Fq : R(S1,∆)(x) = b}|
q
≤
t+ 1
q
,
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which completes the proof.
Remark 4: By Corollary 8, we know that the systematic AMD codes in Theorem 2 of [10] can also be explained by
highly nonlinear functions.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we investigated the relationship between systematic AMD codes and highly nonlinear functions. Highly
nonlinear functions were used to construct systematic AMD codes. By carefully choosing highly nonlinear functions, optimal
systematic AMD codes, some with asymptotically optimal tag size, can be generated. Highly nonlinear functions were also
constructed via systematic AMD codes.
However, in general, it is still an open problem whether we can find highly nonlinear functions to generate optimal AMD
codes with optimal tag size. If it is possible, then how to construct such kinds of highly nonlinear functions is another interesting
topic for future research. According to Theorem 2, the probability of successful tampering for a systematic strong AMD code
is lower bounded by the perfect nonlinearity of the corresponding function. For the general case, how to construct strong AMD
codes via highly nonlinear functions achieving this bound is also widely open.
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